


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3 November 1949

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MEMORANDUM FOR: [REDACTED] OSO

Dear Bill:

As I see it, the first part of this job is a strict intelligence operation in which we evaluate foreign capabilities and perhaps intention. The second stage is a planning and policy job in which the people or agencies concerned evaluate their own abilities to withstand attack and formulate their plans for dealing with them. Therefore, there is no point in having the planning group in at the time of development of the intelligence.

WILLARD NACHEM

25X1A9a cc: [REDACTED], I & S

OSI:WM/mtw

~~SECRET~~

3 November 1949

MEMORANDUM FOR: File on INTERDEPARTMENTAL COMMITTEE ON INTERNAL SECURITY

SUBJECT: Meeting of Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack

1. Meeting held at 1400 hours 31 October 1949 in Room 5218 Department of Justice. Present were:

Dept. of Justice	James H. McInerney (197, x-2867)
USPMS	James J. Hott (176, x-6165)
Dept. of Defense	Lt. Col. E. Black (131, x-75278)
Treasury	Edson J. Shamhas, F. E. Russell (Code 172)
NSRD	William A. Gill (1221, x-3323)
Agriculture	W. A. Minor (161, x-3631)
- ARB	Dr. John Z. Bowers (144, x-335)
- CIA	Dr. Willard Machle (143, [REDACTED])

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2. Briefing by Colonel Hansen, ICIS. The present subcommittee is the first of many that will be formed by ICIS to explore various areas.

3. ICIS is charged with the coordination of a large variety of matters formerly handled by SANACC and now divided by the ICIS and IIC.

4. An example of some of the 50 problems that IIC has are the following:

- a. Prevention of entry through the visa system.
- b. Prevention of exit of agents.
- c. Penetration through foreign diplomatic personnel.
- d. Illegal entries.
- e. Defense against unconventional attack.
- f. Industrial security
- g. Protection of classified data, and the like.

5. Frame of reference of the subcommittee will be to:

- a. Survey field and develop an appreciation of status.
- b. Recommendations for remedial or protective action to be transmitted through ICIS to appropriate agency such as OSD, FBI, Treasury, etc.

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6. It is proposed to meet once or twice a month.
7. Minor elected temporary chairman.
8. Next meeting Tuesday, 8 November 1949, 1400 hours.
9. My opinion is the subcommittee is a lost sheep and will need a lot of guidance. All of their thinking has been developed from lax study mainly of biological and radiological covert operations. No thought has been given to jamming of domestic communications, the fostering of fascist groups, the penetration and destruction of liberal organizations, poison pen letters, strikes, initiation of Senate investigations, etc.

10. The first problem will be to define unconventional warfare and to write out a list of estimated potential of each. List to be brought in fifteen copies to the next meeting.

25X1A9a 11. [redacted] will be alternate and will attend meeting on the 8th.

12. Clear this matter through I & S. There are too many agencies represented and it seems to me that this committee is not the right way to do the job, e.g., the first problem which probably will be posed will be that of the smuggling of an atomic weapon. This will introduce at once the problem of size, shape, assembly, and other restricted data. It does not occur to me that this should be kicked around in the Department of Agriculture or the Public Health Service.

25X1A9a 13. [redacted] for background will contact [redacted] SO for purpose of finding out what was done in World War II, but do not believe this information should receive general dissemination in the Subcommittee.

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14. The following definition for unconventional methods is suggested:

"Unconventional methods of attack include all methods which have hereto not been used or have received no limited an employment as to not have been capable of evaluation as to potential and limitations. The method employed may be covert or overt."

OSD has studied seven fields in the order of imminence and seriousness:

- a. Covert delivery of BW
- b. Covert delivery of A-bomb
- c. Covert delivery CW
- d. Attacks on key men, groups, or installations, e.g.:

- (1) Attack against retaliatory striking force.
- (2) Special applications of PW, e.g., threat or use of weapon of mass destruction.

e. Unconventional methods of economic warfare:

- (1) Unauthorized shipment of gold.
- (2) Bear raids.
- (3) Falseification of government statistics.

15. Copies of much of this material will be forthcoming.

~~SECRET~~

18 April 1950

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD:

SUBJECT: Subcommittees of ICIS

1. The following Subcommittees of ICIS are now actively functioning as of March 17, 1950:

ICIS Subcommittee on Defense Against Unconventional Attack

ICIS Subcommittee on Entry and Exit

ICIS Subcommittee on Foreign Diplomatic and Official Personnel

ICIS Subcommittee on Protection of Classified Government Data

ICIS Subcommittee on Industrial Security

SIGNED

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BMW/jel

cc: Chrono
Field

1 cc - ICIS ✓
1 cc - Dept. of Justice

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Membership:

Chief, Inspection and Security Staff

16 May 1950

Security Control Staff

Clearance of Foreign Requests by CIA.

REFERENCE: DIO Report (6ND) dated 9 March 1950.

1. The reference points out another hiatus in the overall federal security program, namely, that outside the services and one or two other agencies like AEC, a federal department or agency does not know whether to decline or to honor a request from a foreign individual or corporation. Unless it is told or has reason to strongly believe that classified material is involved, a non-military agency will ordinarily approve a request from a foreigner for information which sounds innocuous on its face.

2. Screening of foreign requests is an internal security function which each department now exercises as an agency matter. If such a function were centralized, as it was during the war, CIA might well perform a common service by advising from a CI viewpoint on the loyalty and background of a particular foreign requestor. For the present, however, the only thing an agency can do is to ask the State Department for advice or decide each request on its own.

3. The ICIS might well establish a procedure for handling these requests including any suggestions we may have to assist them from a counterintelligence viewpoint.

4. In the instant case, a copy of the reference was routed to OSO and OPC. Presumably, they will check the CE aspect of the request. [REDACTED] with its address is listed in the following publications available to the public: Thomas' Register of American Manufacturers and Dun and Bradstreet.

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cc: Chrono
File ✓

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FILED: ICIS
Foreign Requests (w/basic)